Naturalism and the hard problem of mysticism in psychedelic science.

Psychedelic substances are known to facilitate mystical-type experiences which can include metaphysical beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality. Such insights have been criticized as being incompatible with naturalism and therefore false. This leads to two problems. The easy problem is to elaborate on what is meant by the "fundamental nature of reality," and whether mystical-type conceptions of it are compatible with naturalism. The hard problem is to show how mystical-type insights, which from the naturalistic perspective are brain processes, could afford insight into the nature of reality beyond the brain. I argue that naturalism is less restrictive than commonly assumed, allowing that reality can be more than what science can convey. I propose that what the mystic refers to as the ultimate nature of reality can be considered as its representation- and observation-independent nature, and that mystical-type conceptions of it can be compatible with science. However, showing why the claims of the mystic would be true requires answering the hard problem. I argue that we can in fact directly know the fundamental nature of one specific part of reality, namely our own consciousness. Psychedelics may amplify our awareness of what consciousness is in itself, beyond our conceptual models about it. Moreover, psychedelics may aid us to become aware of the limits of our models of reality. However, it is far from clear how mystical-type experience could afford access to the fundamental nature of reality at large, beyond one's individual consciousness. I conclude that mystical-type conceptions about reality may be compatible with naturalism, but not verifiable.

Parthenogenesis, identity, and value.

Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which a gamete (ovum or sperm) develops without being fertilized. Tomer Jordi Chaffer uses parthenogenesis to challenge Don Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion. According to Marquis, (1) what makes it morally wrong to kill us is that it would deprive us of a possible future that we might come to value-a future "like ours" (FLO) and (2) human fetuses are numerically identical to any adult human organism they may develop into, and thus have a FLO. Chaffer contends that if human ova are capable of parthenogenesis, then they would have a FLO, which contraception may deprive them of, but contends this is absurd. Bruce P. Blackshaw challenges Chaffer, contending sexually fertilized embryos are not identical to unfertilized ovum, but this would yield a more absurd implication, that fertilization deprives an ovum of a FLO! Here I show Marquis' account of identity rules out both Chaffer's and Blackshaw's accounts.

Doping Existential Despair: Mindful of the Exotic Lure.

The paper builds on (von Fircks, E. Integr. psych. Behav. Sci. 2023) article on mindfulness meditation analysed in a Meadian perspective. First, the selective appropriation of some concepts by hegemonic psychology is critically discussed. Then, the consequences of adopting the whole philosophical system of Eastern perspectives are envisaged. Finally, a proposal for a truly ecological shift in the study of self is proposed.

Psychiatrists' Illustration of Awe in Empathic Listening Assessments: A Pilot Study.

Background "Awe" is typically an inspiring emotional response to perceptually vast stimuli signifying the transcendence beyond all cognitive frames of reference when we encounter the unexpected. Physicians' experience of awe in clinical care interactions has not been studied in an empirical, evidence-based way. We aim to present a focused study of awe in a psychiatrist's empathic listening (EL) assessments and propose an evidence-based framework to study it. Methodology This is an exploratory case series of a psychiatrist's EL interactions (mean duration/x̄ of 46.17 minutes) with six patients (two males and four females) aged 32-72 years (x̄ =54.67, σ = 16.64). Using the method of autoethnography, the verbal and nonverbal aspects of the EL assessments were analyzed and open-coded to generate qualitative data. Results The study revealed that the data in all the case studies could be classed into two thematic groups, namely, mindfulness and transpersonal mindfulness. The emotions of "awe" and "non-agency" were ubiquitous in all six case studies both for the psychiatrist and patients. Conclusions Recognizing the awe and non-agency in EL interaction is essential in conceptualizing the "mindfulness-to-transcendence" framework and the first step toward the evidence-based study of transcendence/metaphysics in phenomenological psychiatry.

What is the Philosophy of Neurosurgery? Systematic Review and Defining the Discipline.

INTRODUCTION: Despite centuries of joint investigation of philosophy and neurological interventions, a founding account for the philosophy of neurosurgery has yet to be rigorously constructed or defended. This paper reviews recent work on the philosophy of neurosurgery, spanning metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory, to establish a framework and clinical relevance for study in the philosophy of neurosurgery. METHODS: A systematic review of an online database was conducted using the broad search terms, "Philosophy AND (Neurosurgery OR Neurological Surgery)." Records were included if they demonstrated relevance to the philosophy of neurosurgery and analytical rigor, but were excluded if solely legal, clinical, or ethical principles were considered without substantive discussion of underlying ethical frameworks and philosophical principles. RESULTS: Of 8025 candidates from online and print records, 16 records (14 from online sources and 2 from an edited volume) met inclusion criteria for the systematic review. Three dealt with metaphysics, 3 dealt with epistemology, 4 dealt with value theory, 5 dealt with metaphysics/epistemology, and 1 dealt with value theory/metaphysics. Questions of free will, consciousness, personal identity, neurosurgical knowledge, ascription of other minds, deontology, and minimalism, among others, were considered. DISCUSSION: Based on identified studies, the philosophy of neurosurgery is defined as the discipline of rigorously and methodically addressing metaphysical, epistemological, and value-theoretic questions arising from physically intervening in the nervous system. We discuss future directions for questions within the philosophy of neurosurgery and consider their relevance for patient care and the practice of neurosurgery.

Public Reason Requirements in Bioethical Discourse.

This paper analyzes the use of public reason requirements in bioethical discourse and discusses when such requirements are warranted. By a "public reason requirement," I mean a requirement that those involved in a particular discourse or debate only use reasons that can properly be described as public reasons. The first part of the paper outlines the concept of public reasons as developed by John Rawls and others and discusses some of the general criticisms of the concept and its importance. The second part then distinguishes between two types of public reason requirements in bioethics. One type is what I will call the orthodox public reason requirement since it hews closely to the original Rawlsian conception. The second is what I will call the expansive public reason requirement, which departs quite radically from the Rawlsian conception and applies the requirement not to policy discourse or policymaking, but to the actions of individuals. Both types of requirements will be analyzed, and some problems in applying public reason requirements in bioethics will be identified. It will be argued that the expansive public reason requirement is misguided. The concluding part argues that requirements of civic civility and what Rawls terms an "inclusive view" of public reason should be important in bioethical discourse.

The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0's Realist Idealism.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory's most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just "operational". However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT's idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT's idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT's realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one's own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues.

Bergson, Pan(en)theism, and 'Being-in-Life'.

Recent philosophy has witnessed a renewed interest in the works and ideas of Henri Bergson (1859-1941). But while contemporary scholarship has sought to rehabilitate Bergson's insights on time, memory, consciousness, and human freedom, comparatively little attention has been paid to Bergson's relationship to pantheism. By revisiting the 'pantheism' controversy surrounding Bergsonian philosophy during Bergson's lifetime, this article argues that the panentheistic notion of 'being-in-God' can serve as an illuminating framework for the interpretation of Bergson's philosophy. By examining the 'pantheist' readings of Bergson and comparing and contrasting Bergson's philosophy of life with Spinoza's panentheistic metaphysics, this paper shows that an account of 'being-in-Life' is key to Bergson's metaphysical outlook as well as his account of philosophy as a practice of 'intuitive' thinking. In so doing, this paper highlights some of the implicit religious motifs not only in Bergson's metaphysical outlook but also in his conception of the task of philosophy.

Thinking Childbirth from an Emancipatory Perspective? Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis.

Feminist thought, despite the importance of its work, has not resolved the phenomenon of women's subordination in the care and education of children, and in society as a whole. Meanwhile, we are witnessing a gradual but continuous process of disconnection between women's bodies and subjectivity, and the conception, pregnancy and birth of children, due to developments in reproductive techniques. Considering this paradoxical tension, the author proposes to return to the very place where this subordination and anticipated rupture occur, to consider whether mothers could find there both the means to reclaim their childbirth experiences and potential levers for emancipation and rebirth, on both a personal and societal level. To this end, she describes, from the point of view of a singular woman, and from an emancipatory perspective, the phenomenological and psychoanalytical itinerary of childbirth by which this woman, in becoming a mother, is born to herself by giving birth to her child. By co-constituting the universal meaning of childbirth and becoming a philosophical mother, this singular woman operates a real paradigm shift in our representations of the mother and the metaphysical structure of the sexes.

Les pensées féministes, malgré l'importance de leurs travaux, ne sont pas venues à bout du phénomène de la subordination des femmes dans les tâches de soin et d'éducation des enfants, et dans l'ensemble de la société. Dans le même temps, nous assistons à un processus progressif mais continu de rupture entre le corps et la subjectivité des femmes, et la conception, la grossesse et la naissance des enfants, en raison des développements des techniques reproductives. Considérant cette tension paradoxale, l'autrice propose de revenir à l'endroit même où s'exercent cette subordination en même temps que cette rupture annoncée afin de considérer si les femmes mères ne pourraient pas y trouver, à la fois, des moyens de se réapproprier leurs enfantements et des leviers potentiels d'émancipation et de renaissance, sur le plan personnel comme sociétal. À cette fin, elle décrit, du point de vue d'une femme singulière, et dans une perspective émancipatrice, l'itinéraire phénoménologique et psychanalytique de l'enfantement par lequel cette femme devenant mère naît à soi-même en donnant naissance à son enfant. En co-constituant le sens universel de l'enfantement et son devenir mère philosophe, cette femme singulière opère un véritable changement de paradigme de nos représentations de la mère et de la structure métaphysique des sexes.

El pensamiento feminista, a pesar de su importancia, aún debe superar el fenómeno de la subordinación de las mujeres en las tareas de cuidado y crianza de los hijos, y en la sociedad en su conjunto. Al mismo tiempo, asistimos a un proceso gradual pero continuo de ruptura entre el cuerpo y la subjetividad de las mujeres, y la concepción, el embarazo y el nacimiento de los hijos, debido al desarrollo de las técnicas reproductivas. Teniendo en cuenta esta tensión paradójica, la autora propone volver al lugar mismo donde se producen esta subordinación y esta ruptura para considerar si las mujeres madres no podrían encontrar allí, al mismo tiempo, algunos medios de reivindicación del parto e instrumentos potenciales de emancipación y de renacimiento, tanto a nivel personal como a nivel social. Para ello, describe, desde el punto de vista de una mujer singular, y desde una perspectiva emancipadora, el itinerario fenomenológico y psicoanalítico del parto por el que esta mujer, al convertirse en madre, nace a sí misma al dar a luz a su hijo. Al co-constituir el sentido universal del parto y convertirse en madre filosófica, esta mujer singular opera un verdadero cambio de paradigma en nuestras representaciones de la madre y de la estructura metafísica de los sexos.

A plea for descriptive social ontology.

Social phenomena-quite like mental states in the philosophy of mind-are often regarded as potential troublemakers from the start, particularly if they are approached with certain explanatory commitments, such as naturalism or social individualism, already in place. In this paper, we argue that such explanatory constraints should be at least initially bracketed if we are to arrive at an adequate non-biased description of social phenomena. Legitimate explanatory projects, or so we maintain, such as those of making the social world fit within the natural world with the help of, e.g., collective intentionality, social individualism, and the like, should neither exclude nor influence the prior description of social phenomena. Just as we need a description of the mental that is not biased, for example, by (anti)physicalist constraints, we need a description of the social that is not biased, for example, by (anti)individualist or (anti)naturalist commitments. Descriptive social ontology, as we shall conceive of it, is not incompatible with the adoption of explanatory frameworks in social ontology; rather, the descriptive task, according to our conception, ought to be recognized as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. If social phenomena are, for example, to be reduced to nonsocial (e.g., psychological or physical) phenomena, we need first to understand clearly what the social candidates for the reduction in question are. While such descriptive or naïve approaches have been influential in general metaphysics (see Fine 2017), they have so far not been prominent in analytic social ontology (though things are different outside of analytic philosophy, see esp. Reinach (1913). In what follows, we shall outline the contours of a descriptive approach by arguing, first, that description and explanation need to be distinguished as two distinct ways of engaging with social phenomena. Secondly, we defend the claim that the descriptive project ought to be regarded as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. We begin, in Section 2, by considering two different ways of engaging with mental phenomena: a descriptive approach taken by descriptive psychology and an explanatory approach utilized in analytic philosophy of mind. We take these two ways of approaching the study of the mind to be analogous to the distinction we want to draw in social ontology between a descriptive and an explanatory approach to the study of social phenomena. We consider next, in Section 3, how our approach compares to neighboring perspectives that are familiar to us from general metaphysics and philosophy more broadly, such as Aristotle's emphasis on "saving the appearances", Strawson's distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, as well as Fine's contrast between naïve and foundational metaphysics. In Section 4, we apply the proposed descriptive/explanatory distinction to the domain of social ontology and argue that descriptive social ontology ought to take precedence in the order of inquiry over explanatory social ontology. Finally, in Section 5, we consider and respond to several objections to which our account might seem to be susceptible.

Corrigendum: Studying Brains. What could neurometaphysics be to NeurotechEU?

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2023.1155547.].

On identity, indiscernibility and (non-)individuality in the quantum domain.

The topics of identity, individuality and indiscernibility had already entered the domain of the philosophy of physics, mainly in what respects the philosophy of quantum theories. In this paper, I present the main ideas of an underlying metaphysics that considers the basic entities of quantum physics as non-individuals, that is, as entities to which the standard theory of identity of classical logic and standard mathematics (set theory) does not apply. Two things must be emphasized: the first is that we pursue Erwin Schrödinger's ideas that the notion of identity (or sameness) does not apply to quantum things; the second is to follow Heinz Post's claim that the non-individuality of quantum entities 'must be introduced right at the start' and not by taking individuals and making them pretend to be non-individuals 'by hand', say by confining them to non-rigid structures. Thus, this paper should be regarded as an attempt to justify the metaphysics of non-individuals and the logical systems that cope with them, although these systems are here only referred to. We also answer some criticisms that have been directed to such a view. The paper is directed to an audience of both physicists interested in foundations and philosophers of physics. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'.

A no-individuals account of quantum mechanics.

One of the most famous metaphysical problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerns the individuality status of quantum entities: are they individuals, or non-individuals? The typical approach to the problem consists in defending one of the options by appealing directly to features of quantum mechanics with the addition, eventually, of theoretical virtues the favoured proposal may have. In this paper, we argue that this strategy is inappropriate, because the problem of individuality is ill formulated in the case of quantum mechanics. In a nutshell, our point is that considerations exclusively from quantum mechanics are too general and generic to grant the level of particularity required for providing for a principle of individuality. Problems of individuality appear only at the level of particular applications of the theory in specific contexts, and in these cases, we shall argue, search for a metaphysical notion of individuality may be substituted by an epistemic notion of individuation. The approach also has the benefits of dissolving the problems created by metaphysical underdetermination on this front. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'.

Studying brains what could neurometaphysics be to NeurotechEU?

NeurotechEU has introduced a new conceptual hierarchy for neuroscientific research and its applications along 8 different core research areas, including the so-called 'neurometaphysics'. This paper explores this concept of neurometaphysics, its topics and its potential approach. It warns against an endemic Cartesianism in (neuro)science that somehow seems to survive explicit refutations by implicitly persisting in our conceptual scheme. Two consequences of this persisting Cartesian legacy are discussed; the isolated brain assumption and the idea that activity requires identifiable neural 'decisions'. Neuropragmatism is introduced as offering the promise of progress in neurometaphysics, by emphasizing that (1) studying brains interact organically with their environment and (2) studying brains requires an attitude of continuous learning.

Should physical symmetries guide metaphysics? Two reasons why they should maybe not.

Symmetry-based inferences have permeated many discussions in philosophy of physics and metaphysics of science. It is claimed that symmetries in our physical theories would allow us to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world, a view that I call 'symmetry inferentialism'. This paper is critical to this view. I claim that (a) it assumes a philosophically questionable characterization of the relevant validity domain of physical symmetries, and (b) it overlooks a distinction between two opposing ways through which relevant physical symmetries become established. My conclusion is that symmetry inferentialism loses persuasive force when these two points are taken into consideration.

On the need for metaphysics in psychedelic therapy and research.

The essential proposal of this text is that psychedelic-induced metaphysical experiences should be integrated and evaluated with recourse to metaphysics. It will be argued that there is a potential extra benefit to patients in psychedelic-assisted therapy if they are provided with an optional, additional, and intelligible schema and discussion of metaphysical options at the integrative phase of the therapy. This schema (the "Metaphysics Matrix") and a new Metaphysics Matrix Questionnaire ("MMQ") stemming therefrom will be presented, the latter of which can also be used as an alternative or additional tool for quantitative measurement of psychedelic experience in trials. Metaphysics is not mysticism, despite some overlap; and certainly not all psychedelic experience is metaphysical or mystical-all three terms will be defined and contrasted. Thereafter psychedelic therapy will be presented and analysed in order to reveal the missing place for metaphysics. Metaphysics, with epistemology (theory of knowledge) and axiology (ethics and aesthetics), is a defining branch of Philosophy. Metaphysics, in contrast to mysticism, is considered to be based on argument rather than pure revelation. Thus, in psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy one sees here the potential bridge between reason-based philosophy and practical therapy-or, more broadly, with psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy there is the potential and mutually beneficial fusion of philosophy with practical science.

The Mereotopology of Pregnancy.

Consider the following two metaphysical questions about pregnancy: (1) When does a new organism of a certain kind start to exist? (2) What is the mereological and topological relationship between the pregnant organism and with what it is pregnant? Despite assumptions made in the literature, I take these questions to be independent of each other, such that an answer to one does not provide an answer to the other. I argue that the way to connect them is via a maximality principle that prevents one organism being a proper part of another organism of the same kind. That being said, such a maximality principle need not be held, and may not apply in the case of pregnancy. The aims of this paper are thus to distinguish and connect these metaphysical questions, in order to outline a taxonomy of rival mereotopological models of pregnancy that result from the various combinations of their answers.

Future-like-ours as a metaphysical reductio ad absurdum argument of personal identity.

Don Marquis' future-like-ours account is regarded as the best secular anti-abortion position because he frames abortion as a wrongful killing via deprivation of a valuable future. Marquis objects to the reductio ad absurdum of contraception as being immoral because it is too difficult to identify an individual that is deprived of a future. To demonstrate why Marquis' treatment of the contraception reductio is flawed by his own future-like-ours line of reasoning, I offer an argument for why there is indeed a candidate for harm-the ovum-for it can be viewed as providing the functional foundation for a new life through (1) mitochondrial DNA inheritance, (2) paternal histone restructuring during fertilization, and (3) ability to initiate parthenogenesis. As evidenced by these distinct and natural features of ova, candidate (2) "some ovum or other" should be morally prioritized as the direct candidate for harm in the contraception reductio. By assessing the philosophical inconsistencies in Marquis' future-like-ours argument, this paper provides strong metaphysical grounds for rejecting the best secular anti-abortion position.

Against methodological continuity and metaphysical knowledge.

The main purpose of this paper is to refute the 'methodological continuity' argument supporting epistemic realism in metaphysics. This argument aims to show that scientific realists have to accept that metaphysics is as rationally justified as science given that they both employ inference to the best explanation, i.e. that metaphysics and science are methodologically continuous. I argue that the reasons given by scientific realists as to why inference to the best explanation (IBE) is reliable in science do not constitute a reason to believe that it is reliable in metaphysics. The justification of IBE in science and the justification of IBE in metaphysics are two distinct issues with only superficial similarities, and one cannot rely on one for the other. This becomes especially clear when one analyses the debate about the legitimacy of IBE that has taken place between realists and empiricists. The metaphysician seeking to piggyback on the realist defense of IBE in science by the methodological continuity argument presupposes that the defense is straightforwardly applicable to metaphysics. I will argue that it is, in fact, not. The favored defenses of IBE by scientific realists make extensive use of empirical considerations, predictive power and inductive evidence, all of which are paradigmatically absent in the metaphysical context. Furthermore, even if the realist would concede the methodological continuity argument, I argue that the metaphysician fails to offer any agreed upon conclusions resulting from its application in metaphysics.

What is attention? Adverbialist theories.

This article presents theories of attention that attempt to derive their answer to the question of what attention is from their answers to the question of what it is for some activity to be done attentively. Such theories provide a distinctive account of the difficulties that are faced by the attempt to locate processes in the brain by which the phenomena of attention can be explained. Their account does not share the pessimism of theories suggesting that the concept of attention is defective. Instead it reconstrues the explanatory relationship between attention and the processes that constitute it, in a way that is illustrated here by considering the relationship between attention and the processes that are identified by the biased competition theory. After considering some of the ways in which an adverbialist approach might be developed, the article concludes by suggesting some possible solutions to a problem concerning distraction, by which prominent adverbialist theories of attention have been dogged. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Metaphysics Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science.